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ducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws." "
Hence, the position taken that there is a needless distinction
drawn between tort and tortious act in the instant cases does
open the door to the further problem of drawing the line between
the situations where CPLR 302 (a) (2) can be constitutionally applied and those wherein its application would be unconstitutional.
The fact that such a problem would face the courts, however,
should not act as a deterrent to proper construction of the statute,
but rather, should serve as a stimulus towards meeting the problem
created when combining the due process requirements of "minimum
contacts" with the expanded jurisdictional bases now being
utilized.
CPLR 302(a)(3): Ownership, use or possession of real property.
Tebedo V. Nye,75 one of the infrequent decisions construing
CPLR 302 (a) (3), involved a cause of action for failure to convey
real property. Defendant Nye, after agreeing to sell the disputed
land to the plaintiffs and accepting the consideration, conveyed the
entire parcel to defendant McLaughlin. McLaughlin, allegedly
with knowledge of a prior agreement to convey to the plaintiffs,
conveyed the realty to a third party. Subsequently, McLaughlin
established residence in Florida where he was served personally
under CPLR 302 (a) (3). The court held that irrespective of the
fact that the defendant McLaughlin no longer had any interest
in the land, nor owned any other real estate in New York, jurisdiction would nonetheless be sustained on the basis of "the
relationship existing between the defendant and the realty out of
cause of action arose at the time the cause of action
which the
76
arose."
CPLR 305(b):

Amendment.

CPLR 305(b), as originally enacted, provided that for purposes
of a default judgment it would not be necessary to serve a
complaint with the summons if (1) the claim was for a sum
certain, and (2) a notice stating this sum was served with the
summons. The CPLR 305(b) notice would take the place of the
complaint for default purposes. In 1965, this was amended to
provide for the expanded use of such notice, i.e., a statement of
the nature of the action and the relief demanded in monetary
as well as non-monetary actions. There is some disagreement as
74 Ibid.
Misc. 2d 222, 256 N.Y.S.2d 235
1965).
76 Id. at 223, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
7545

(Sup.

Ct. Onondaga County

